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A-S-P Associates v. Raleigh: A
Recent Court Test of Historic
Preservation in North Carolina
In October, 1979, the North Carolina
Supreme Court handed down a decision on one of
the most significant land-use planning cases to
be heard by that Court. Among the planning-law
issues to be decided by the Court in A-S-P
Associates v. Raleigh (1979) were the validity
of historic district zoning, contextual stand-
ards for administrative issuance of permits,
spot-zoning, validity of overlapping zoning
districts, and the comprehensive-plan
requirement. The decision represents a major
victory for the historic preservation movement
in the state, as North Carolina becomes the
first Southeastern state to affirm the consti-
tutional validity of historic preservation.
The following article will discuss the context
and nature of the decision handed down by the
Court, as well as the implications for future
planning practice in the state.
THE CONTEXT OF THE CASE
During the last decade, Raleigh, like many
other cities, experienced rapid growth on its
periphery and decline of its downtown residen-
tial neighborhoods. The Oakwood neighborhood,
located directly East of the Governor's Mansion
in downtown Raleigh, reflected the problem.
Absentee ownership, redlining, real estate
speculation, and nearly twice the city-wide
rate of deteriorated and dilapidated housing
units characterized the 100-acre neighborhood.
At the start of the decade, the City of Raleigh
had adopted a remedial planning strategy to
combat these problems, which included increased
residential density for the downtown, as well
as construction of direct highway access
through downtown. By 1975, however, both the
north-south expressway and high-density resi-
dential zoning had been abandoned.
An alternative to the development strategy,
presented in a planning staff report, recom-
mended that Oakwood contain medium residential
density with emphasis on preserving its historic
aspects. The impetus for this recommendation
came from the Division of Archives and History
of the North Carolina Department of Cultural
Resources, which nominated Oakwood for inclu-
sion in the United States Department of
Interior's National Register of Historic Places.
The neighborhood was placed on the National
Register in June, 1974. In the required state-
ment of significance, the division's survey and
planning unit observed:
Oakwood, a twenty-block area representing
the only intact nineteenth century neighbor-
hood remaining in Raleigh, is composed
predominantly of Victorian houses built
between the Civil War and 1914. Its
depressed economic state during most of the
twentieth century preserved the neighborhood
until 1971, when individuals began its
devitalization. The great variety of
Victorian architectural styles represented
by the houses reflects the primarily middle-
class tastes of the business and political
leaders of Raleigh for whom they were built,
as well as the skill of local architects and
builders. Oakwood is a valuable physical
document of Southern suburban life during
the last quarter of the nineteenth century
(A-S-P Associates v. Raleigh, 1979).
Proceeding under North Carolina's newly
enacted historic district enabling law, the
Raleigh City Council amended its zoning ordi-
nance to create a 102-acre historic district
which overlaid the Oakwood neighborhood,
established the Raleigh Historic District
Commission, and adopted architectural guide-
lines and design standards to be applied by the
commission in its administration of the
ordinance. The ordinance regulates building
activity by requiring that all property owners
who desire to erect, alter, restore, or move
the exterior portion of any building, structure,
or sign first obtain a certificate of appro-
priateness from the Historic District
Commission. The Commission is authorized to
prevent any such activity that is incongruous
with the historic aspects of the district.
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The plaintiff, A-S-P Associates, is a
] aw firm that owns a small vacant lot in the
Oakwood Historic District. The lot, located at
the edge of the district, is part of a rela-
tively small area zoned for office and
institutional uses. As part of the overlay
historic district, Associates is allowed to
erect an office building, but its design must
be congruous with the Victorian architecture
of Oakwood. A-S-P Associates brought a
declaratory judgment action to invalidate the
Oakwood ordinances, as applied to its property,
on both statutory and constitutional grounds.
THE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE
The first of these grounds was that the
historic district ordinance violated due
process. Due process, as applied to land use
cases, requires that local regulations be
related to the promotion of the public health,
safety, and general welfare, and that the
effects of such regulations be reasonable.
The basic constitutional objection raised by
Associates was that the historic district ordi-
nance was outside the lawful scope of the
police power. The Plaintiff contended that the
ordinance focused entirely on the exterior
appearance of structures in the district and,
therefore, was based solely on aesthetic con-
siderations without any real or substantial
relation to the public health, safety, or
general welfare. If accepted, this contention
would prevent government regulation of private
property for historic preservation in North
Carolina. The North Carolina Supreme Court
THE DECISION REPRESENTS A MAJOR
VICTORY FOR THE HISTORIC PRESERVATION
MOVEMENT IN THE STATE, ,
,"
held that regulation of the exterior appearance
of private property in the interest of historic
preservation is a valid exercise of the police
powers; in other words, historic preservation
regulations promote the general welfare.
Specifically, the Court found that historic
preservation of the exterior appearance of
buildings and structures promotes the accom-
plishment of a public good in a number of ways:
it provides a visual, educational medium by
which an understanding of our country's his-
toric and cultural heritage may be imparted to
present and future generations; it tends to
foster architectural creativity by preserving
physical examples of outstanding architectural
techniques of the past; it can generate sub-
stantial tourism revenues; it can stimulate
rev i tal izat ion of deteriorating residential and
commercial districts in urban areas, thus
contributing to their economic and social
stability (A-S-P Associates, 1 979)
-
As part of its analysis, the Court recog-
nized that the police power cannot be placed
within fixed, definitive limits and that it may
be extended to meet changing economic and
social conditions. Further the Court cited
with approval a federal court decision (Maher
v. New Orleans, 1975) which held that "proper
state purposes may encompass not only the goal
of abating undesirable conditions but of
fostering ends the community deems worthy....
Nor need the values advanced be solely economic
or directed at health and safety in their
narrowest senses. The police power inferred in
the lawmaker is more generous, comprehending
more subtle and ephemeral societal
interests."
These pronouncements together with approval
of historic preservation zoning may reflect a
willingness by the North Carolina Supreme Court
to allow localities to move away from tradi-
tional zoning (minimization of friction between
land uses) and to allow local regulations which
protect the environment, preserve the social
character of the locality, and order urban
development. Nonetheless, even with the A-S-P
decision, North Carolina law is still not pre-
pared to endorse reasonable regulations of
property for aesthetic reasons alone. This
caveat is regrettable. Admittedly, historic
preservation regulations are distinguishable
from aesthetic regulations (Rathkopf, 1975:
1 5 — ^* ) - However, the issue of aesthetic regula-
tion was seriously contested by the plaintiff,
and presently it is an important planning-law
concern. The regulation of building design,
landscape, and signs is commonplace, even in
North Carolina. The silence of the opinion
casts doubt about the validity of such regula-
tions in North Carolina. The widespread
enactment of aesthetic regulation, moreover,
reveals that it is one of the primary devices
local governments use to enhance the quality
of life. Although approval of aesthetic
regulation was unnecessary to the Court's
holding, resolution of the issue would have
eliminated the legal uncertainty about such
regulation. It would have also strengthened
the apparent willingness of the Court to accept
more ephemeral societal interests as a basis
for regulation.
A second important aspect of the A-S-P
decision is its holding that requiring certifi-
cates of appropriateness for new construction
is reasonable, even when applied to a vacant
lot. No other appellate historic preservation
case has approved the application of historic
preservation to a vacant lot. Favorable reso-
lution of this issue will enhance historic
preservation efforts, since it is unavoidable
that in historic districts some tracts of land
will be vacant, and the potential for develop-
ment and incongruous building activity is
greater on vacant tracts than on already
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developed lots. Preservation and protection of
the setting or scene in which structures of
architectural and historical significance are
situated is just as important to historic pre-
servation as preserving and protecting
significant buildings. If concern is limited
to historic buildings only, landmark and
historic site laws alone would be sufficient to
protect the historical legacy of the nation.
Now, however, it is recognized that externali-
ties have an impact and must likewise be
regul ated.
STANDARDS FOR HISTORIC
DISTRICT REGULATION
A-S-P Associates also contended that the
standards to guide the Historic District
Commission were inadequate. This contention
is bottomed on the rule which prohibits the
delegation of legislative powers to adminis-
trative bodies. Accordingly, administrative
bodies are not allowed to establish goals and
policies (Jackson v. Board of Adjustment, 1969);
their power is limited to determining facts
which implement policies of the legislature.
Fact-finding responsibilities must rest on
definite, ascertainable standards; otherwise,
the courts will invalidate the regulation
(Coastal Highway v. Turnpike Authority, 1953).
To show i ndef i n i teness and unlawful delegation
of legislative powers, Associates attacked the
architectural guidelines incorporated into the
Oakwood ordi nance.
2
Although municipalities have unlimited dis-
cretion to establish an historic district, the
Court found that once a district is established,
discretion is limited insofar as the method and
the standard by which an historic district is
regulated (A-S-P Associates v. Raleigh, 1979).
Specifically, historic districts are adminis-
tered by an historic district commission, the
composition of which is specified by the
General Assembly; the objects subject to
regulation are delineated; and the procedural
safeguards to offer expert evidence, cross-
examine witnesses, and inspect documents help
prevent administrative abuse (A-S-P Associates
v. Raleigh, 1979). Furthermore, the high Court
recognized that practical necessity requires
that a substantial degree of discretionary
authority be delegated to administrative bodies
if historic preservation is to be achieved.
The analysis by the Court of the contextual
standard of incongruity is particularly impor-
tant to future preservation and planning cases.
Both the state statute and Raleigh ordinance
prevent building activity incongruous with the
historic aspects of the district. As recognized
by the Court, contextual standards derive their
meaning from the total physical environment of
the area, which must therefore be sufficiently
distinctive to provide the required legal
Oakwood residences represent a variety of
Victorian architectural style.
specificity. The standard of incongruity, when
applied to Oakwood, is meaningful due to the
Victorian architectural style which character-
izes the area. Although other architectural
styles are present in Oakwood, they do not
render the standard of incongruity meaningless.
These other styles are generally equally dis-
tinctive, and the architectural guidelines and
design standards incorporated into the ordinance
provide analysis of the structural elements of
these different architectural styles.
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ISSUES IN HISTORIC DISTRICT LEGISLATION
Now that establishing historic districts,
regulating new construction on vacant lots in
these areas, and prohibiting incongruous build-
ing activity are firmly established in North
Carolina, future preservation court cases will
test specific applications of historic district
regulations. Preservationists and their lawyers
must alert themselves to the issues raised in
such appl i cations
.
One issue which landowners may attack is
the appropriateness of the historic district
designation; not all areas of a city are of
historical and architectural significance
(remember, the Oakwood area is on the National
Register of Historic Places). Furthermore,
even if an area can fairly be termed historic
owing, for instance, to its association with a
famous person, the heterogeneous character of
the area may not permit the exercise of the
contextual standard of incongruity. In such a
case, designation of historic sites may be the
only way to achieve historic preservation.
Another issue which may lead to litigation
is procedural safeguards. Now that the North
Carolina Supreme Court has recognized that the
presence or absence of procedural safeguards is
relevant to the broader question of whether a
delegation of authority is accompanied by
adequate standards, it is essential that proce-
dural standards be included in local ordinances
and rigidly followed. At minimum, procedural
due process requires:
1. the party whose rights are being deter-
mined to be given the opportunity to
offer evidence, cros's-exami ne adverse
witnesses, inspect documents, and offer
evidence in rebuttal;
2. absent stipulations or waiver, findings
about crucial facts must not be based
upon unsworn statements;
3. crucial findings of fact must be
supported by competent material, and
substantial evidence in view of the
entire record submitted;
k. the historic district commission must
state, with sufficient specificity, the
basic facts on which it relied to allow
or deny a certificate of appropriateness;
and
5. essential elements of a fair trial be
followed (Humble Oil v. Board of
Aldermen, \3Jk)
.
Failure to follow any of these requirements
will result in invalidating the actions of the
historic district commission. Hence, a letter
from an absent interested party may not be
accepted as evidence, unless stipulated by the
parties. Members of the historic district
commission must disqualify themselves from
particular cases if they have an interest in
the outcome of the decision. If commission
members have special knowledge of relevant
facts, or have acquired such knowledge by per-
sonal inspection of the premises, the informa-
tion must be revealed at the public hearing and
made a part of the record. A notary public or
other qualified person must administer the oath,
unless stipulated otherwise.
Another potential issue for litigation is
the appeal from a denial by the historic
district commission of a certificate of
appropriateness. In North Carolina, the only
reason for denial of a certificate of appropri-
ateness is that the proposed building activity
is incongruous with the historic aspects of the
district. The commission must enter in the
record the historic aspects of the district and
detail how the proposed building activity is
incongruous with those aspects.
Yet another ground for legal challenge is
the validity of the historic district
boundaries. In the A-S-P case, the landowner
alleged that the City of Raleigh acted arbi-
trarily and capriciously in setting the bound-
aries of the Oakwood Historic District.
Associates' property is part of a one block
area, zoned for office and institutional uses,
which, in part, forms the southwest boundary of
the Oakwood Historic District. Located on the
block are four parcels: a nondescript, yellow
brick-veneer building used for office space,
Associates' vacant lot, the former Mansion
Square Inn (built in the late nineteenth
century), and a new office building of the
State Medical Society. At the request of the
Medical Society, its building and two lots used
",
.
.HISTORIC PRESERVATION, .PROMOTES
THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF A PUBLIC GOOD IN
A NUMBER OF WAYS. .
."
for off-street parking were excluded from the
Historic District overlay. Associates' request
that its vacant lot be similarly excluded was
denied; its property, as well as all other pro-
perty on the block, was included in the
Historic District. This, according to the
plaintiff, violates the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection and constitutes spot zoning.
The Court of Appeals held that these facts con-
stitute a prima facie showing of arbitrary and
capricious spot zoning (A-S-P Associates v.
Raleigh, 1979).
Spot zoning in North Carolina is "(a) zoning
ordinance or amendment which singles out and
reclassifies a relatively small tract owned by
a single person and surrounded by a much larger
area, uniformly zoned, so as to impose upon the
small tract greater restrictions than those
imposed upon the larger area; or so as to
relieve the small tract from restrictions to
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which the rest of the area is subjected; and in
the absence of any clear showing of a reasonable
basis for distinguishing among zoning parcels
spot zoning is beyond the authority of a
municipality" (Blades v. Raleigh, 1972).
The Supreme Court (A-S-P Associates v.
Raleigh, 1979) applied a literal and mechanical
solution to the boundary contention and held
that the City of Raleigh did not engage in spot
zoning for two reasons. First, the Oakwood
Historic District overlay, 102 acres, restricted
numerous property owners. Second, the non-
inclusion of certain property owned by the
Medical Society was not a reclassification in
that it was not relieved from any pre-existing
zoning restriction.
In spite of the favorable result, this
aspect of the decision is potentially
troublesome. Spot zoning principles are now an
integral part of historic district case law in
this state, even though considerations used to
delineate historic districts are different from
other zoning boundaries. For example, unlike
the designation of other zoning boundaries,
where consideration of property ownership is
irrelevant, protection of structures associated
with public figures is of course vital to his-
toric preservation. Furthermore, because
historic preservation regulations are based on
contextual standards, local governments must be
free to gerrymander the district in order to
exclude incongruous buildings and uses.
The facts showed that the State Medical
Society's building is a modern structure with
virtually all of its architectural style incon-
gruous with the historic aspects of the Oakwood
Historic District; that the Society made sub-
stantial investments in the foundations of the
building in order that two additional stories
could be added at some future point; and that
The State Medical Society Building was exclud-
ed from the Oakwood Historic District.
the adjacent lots owned by the Medical Society,
which were also excluded from the district,
were acquired to provide additional off-street
parking necessary to future use of the building.
Applying these facts to the standard test of
equal protection, which requires that different
treatment made by laws have a reasonable basis
in relation to the purpose and subject matter
of the legislation, the Supreme Court concluded
that a reasonable basis existed for the
exclusion of the Medical Society's property.
ZONING AND THE
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
The last major issue decided in the A-S-P
case with particular relevancy to planners in
North Carolina is the comprehensive plan
requirement. Recently, courts, commentators,
and legislators have redirected their attention
to the general enabling requirement that zoning
regulations be in accordance with a comprehen-
sive plan. They have begun a close scrutiny of
land-use regulations for their consistency with
existing plans. For the remainder of this
article, this recent trend will be called the
"planning mandate theory."
The specific requirement of a comprehensive
plan is intended to avoid an arbitrary,
unreasonable, or capricious exercise of the
zoning power (Speakman v. Mayor & Council,
1951). Fidelity to a comprehensive plan, it is
believed, will ensure that long-term policy
goals are given more emphasis in local zoning
matters than the pressure of individuals for
special treatment (Harr, 1955). It is also
believed that fidelity will provide the courts
a standard for review of land use matters which
is more sharply defined than the standard due
process test of reasonableness (Harr, 1955).
Still another reason advanced for strict adher-
ence to conformance is the belief that only
through comprehensive decisions, in contrast to
ad hoc determinations, is it possible to
achieve efficient allocation of land uses.
Thus, Harr (1955) has argued that land use
regulations enacted without reference to a for-
mal plan are, per se, unreasonable because they
fail to consider the complex relationship
between various land use controls and the
general wel fare.
North Carolina, like most other states,
does not require zoning decisions to be based
on extrinsic plans. Prior to the A-S-P case
the decisional law in this state merely required
that zoning regulations be geographically com-
prehensive and that such regulations be
reasonably calculated to achieve the aims of
the enabling law (Al 1 red v. Raleigh, 1970).
The Court, in A-S-P, reaffirmed this position
despite the recent application of the planning
mandate theory in other states. Even so, A-S-P
is not an "ant i -pi ann i ng" case.
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Oakwood homes document 19th century suburban
life in the South.
California planning law mandates that the com-
prehensive plan contain specific elements, such
as housing and open spaces, while other states,
such as Oregon, require adoption of state-wide
planning goals to which local plans and regula-
tions must conform. Although North Carolina
has no specific comprehensive plan legislation,
it appears that the approach of this state is
evolving towards the Oregon approach, 3 However
defined, the plan must be specific and inter-
nally consistent or it will amount to little
more than a series of agreeable cliches that
are of little assistance in directing municipal
regulatory efforts. Therefore, under the
planning mandate theory, not only must the
courts mandate planning, they must actively
supervise plan content to ensure specificity
and internal consistency.
The term consistency involves at least
three levels of analysis: internal consistency,
consistency between local plans and state and
federal goals, and consistency between local
plans and local regulations. Although easy to
explain, the concept of consistency is almost
impossible to apply. Minor locational differ-
ences between mapped plans and the actual
zonings have been both tolerated and disallowed
by the courts.^ The state of confusion is per-
haps best illustrated in California. In that
The Court indicated that evidence showed
that Raleigh had engaged in comprehensive
studies of the city's transportation, public
facilities, parks and recreation facilities,
and housing stock. The evidence, moreover,
showed that the adoption of the Oakwood Historic
District Ordinance was based on a planning study
which gave careful consideration to the various
ways Raleigh was attempting to protect and pro-
mote the general welfare. The case can, in
fact, be linked to the "planning factor
doctrine," which advocates that the courts
examine local land use decisions in light of
adopted planning studies, but does not require
the adoption of plans (Sullivan and Kressel
,
1975). The Court's rejection of the planning
mandate theory is justified at this time
because of the numerous problems associated
with the theory.
The most basic of these problems is
definitional. What is a comprehensive plan,
and what is meant by consistency? The illusive
concept of comprehensive planning has been,
and is, the subject of great debate. The
Raleigh planning director (A-S-P Associates v.
Raleigh, 1979) believes that a comprehensive
plan is a rational process with no particular
end-state. The Plaintiff, relying on the New
York case of Udell v. Hass (1968), contends
that a comprehensive plan is revealed through
Judicial review of "all relevant evidence as
garnered from any available source."
THE CONSISTENCY REQUI REMENT . . . IS
INTENDED TO PROVIDE THE COURTS WITH A
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW MORE
SHARPLY DEFINED THAN THE
PROCESS TEST,
STANDARD DUE
state a statute requires that the various land
uses authorized by ordinances be compatible
with the objectives, policies, general land
uses, and programs specified in local plans.
George H. Murphy, California Legislative
Counsel, commenting on whether this statute
allows land regulations which are less intense
than proposed in the plan stated that "a zoning
ordinance which permits either a greater or
less intense land use than that permitted by
the general plan would not be in agreement with
or harmonious with the general plan, and in our
opinion would not be consistent with the
general plan" (Sullivan and Kressel, 1975:52).
The opinion of Murphy, however, is directly
contradicted by the California Attorney
General .
5
The courts are similarly divided on this
simple question. As of 1978, there were at
least twelve California appellate court deci-
sions which have involved the consistency
requirement. Even the advisory guidelines to
assist local governments (drafted by the
California Council of Intergovernmental
Relations) have not, according to Mandelker
(1976), a leading supporter of the planning
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Practical problems aside, it must be asked
if inconsistency is necessarily bad. Justice
Brock, writing for the North Carolina Supreme
Court in the A-S-P case, observed: "A rational
process of planning for a large city's varied
needs inherently involves conflicts, changes,
and inconsistent proposals as to how they should
be met." Excessive reliance on the consistency
requirement might even chill the preparation of
innovative plans by local governments and thus
inadvertently place a premium on planning which
supports existing policies. Unless the courts
involve themselves in reviewing the substance
of plans, there is the further danger that out-
dated plans or plans based on erroneous
assumptions about future change will be imposed
on local governments.
Policy flexibility is needed to prevent a
community from being locked into an undesirable
earlier decision; this was particularly true in
regard to the Oakwood neighborhood for which
Raleigh changed its policy from a development
strategy to a preservation strategy. From a
"IF CONCERN IS LIMITED TO HISTORIC
BUILDINGS ONLY, LANDMARK AND HISTORIC
SITE LAWS ALONE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT,,,"
legal point of view, the community is always
capable of using its police power to adapt to
changing conditions or merely to implement a
different set of values. As the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court (Chenney v. Village, 1968)
explains, "It is a matter of common sense and
reality that a comprehensive plan is not like
the law of the Medes and the Persians; it must
be subject to reasonable change from time to
time as cond i t ions .. .change. " Therefore, amend-
ments to any adopted plan must be allowed, and
court decisions have so recognized this right.
If, however, local governments have the right
to amend their plans without strict controls,
the possibil ity of ad hoc decisions based on
favoritism is just as great under the planning
mandate theory as under the present rule.
Zoning is one of the many regulatory devices
used to implement community plans. Eminent
domain, housing assistance programs, and capital
improvements are but a few of the many non-regu-
latory devices local governments can use to
implement their plans. There is a real dang
that, in reviewing zoning cases for conform!
with local plans, the courts will lose sight
this and, through ther decisions, zoning wi
become the sole regulating device. Because
the stricter requirements for conformance, t
courts may abandon their earlier decisions t
comprehensive plans are advisory documents a
therefore do not give rise to due process
"taking" claims. Thus, if a community plan
designates an area for park and recreation u
and the law in that jurisdiction requires st
adherence to the plan, it seems manifestly
unfair for the landowner to remain uncompens
for the reduction in property values until t
community is able to acquire the property
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sistency review is not an efficient use of
Judicial resources. If, as contended by
supporters of the planning mandate theory, the
proper role of the judiciary is to review land
use regulations for consistency, who reviews
the goals of those plans? Presently, the
greatest utility of plans is the support and
justification of harsh land regulations which
are adverse to regional housing interests.
Attention to the minutiae of consistency may
distract judicial review away from the conse-
quences of plans. It seems that an administra-
tive board with expertise in planning is a more
appropriate forum to understand and evaluate
consistency than the courts. Of course, this
solution requires new legislation. In fact,
the wide range of problems associated with the
planning mandate theory are best resolved by
the legislature. Even supporters of the
"ATTENTION TO THE MINUTIAE OF consis-
tency MAY DISTRACT JUDICIAL REVIEW
AWAY FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF PLANS."
planning mandate theory have advocated legisla-
tive intervention. Therefore, failure to
embrace the planning mandate theory in A-S-P is
not necessarily rejection of the theory.
N.C. 517, 189 S.E. 2d 152 (1972), took
note of the growing body of authority in
other jurisdictions that recognized that
police power may be broad enough to include
regulation of property for aesthetic reasons
alone; the rule in North Carolina, as well
as most other states, is that such regula-
tion is an impermissible exercise of the
pol i ce power.
The guidelines vary in specificity.
For example, the guidelines contain general
standards, such as the prohibition of
building activity that is "flagrantly out
of character;" but they also contain speci-
fic standards, such as those prohibiting
plateglass windows and flat roofs.
The guidelines are divided into three major
divisions: those which apply to proposed
changes to existing structures, those which
apply to new construction, and those which
apply to landscaping. For new construction,
the guidelines set forth limitations on
spacing, lot coverage, and height which are
all related to the same characteristics of
existing structures in proximity to a pro-
posed new structure.
Finally, proponents of the planning mandate
theory have failed to sufficiently explain why
means other than the comprehensive plan cannot
be found to reduce arbitrary local land use
decisions. Equal protection, with its require-
ment that properties which are similarly
situated and located be treated alike, can be
used to ensure fairness. Requiring a statement
of reasons articulating the basis for rezoning
decisions affords another safeguard against
arbitrary and careless action, and such state-
ments are likely to result in greater
consistency in decision-making.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, except for the mechanical approach
to spot zoning and reluctance to permit
aesthetic regulation, A-S-P v. Raleigh is a
very positive planning-law case. It permits
local governments to preserve the historic
legacy of the state, even to the extent of
regulating vacant lots in historic districts.
It recognizes the validity of contextual stand-
ards and establishes procedural and substantive
guidelines on how these standards may be used,
and the court steers a proper middle course
with respect to the role of land use plans in
court deci s ions
.
NOTES
Even though in 1972 the North Carolina
Supreme Court in State v. Vestal, 281
Oakwood was placed on the National Register of
Historic Places in 1974.
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Concrete and steel contemporary building owned
by the N.C. Medical Society.
3. Prior to the recodification in 1972,
sec, 160-174 N.C. Gen. Stat, required that
zoning regulations be in accordance with a
comprehensive plan and be designed to faci-
litate the adequate provision of transpor-
tation, water, sewerage, schools, parks,
and other public requirements. Since 1972,
the specific purposes have been deleted
from I6OA-383 N.C. Gen. Stat. In 1976, the
North Carolina Land Policy Council proposed
that amendments to local land use plans be
submitted for review to the regional
planning body in order to be tested for
consistency with the guidelines of the
regional and state plans. Land Policy
Council, A Land Resources Program for North
Carolina 4-15 (1976). The North Carolina
Coastal Area Management Act requires that
a regional commission prepare guidelines
(N.C. Gen. Stat. sec. 1 I 3A- 1 07 (a) ) and that
county and municipal plans prepare land use
plans (N.C. Gen. Stat. 113A-110). In areas
of environmental concern, local land use
plans must be consistent with the promul-
gated guidelines (N.C, Gen Stat, sees. 1 1 3A-
107(a) and 110(a))
.
4. Compare Buddies v. City Council of West
Linn, 21 Or. 310, 535 P. 2d. 583 (1975),
with Ward V. Knippenberg, 4 1 6 S.W. 2d 746
(1967).
5. 58 Ops. Cal Atty Gen 21, (1975).
6. Compare Marracai v. City of Scappose,
26 Or. App. 131, 552 P. 2d. 552 (1976),
with Louisville v. Kavanaugh,
495 S.W. 2d. 502 (1973).
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